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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Petitioner appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post conviction
relief after an evidentiary hearing which raised

an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim concerning her attorney's conflict of interest due to concurrent
representation with the co-defendant.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The facts are succinctly described in the substitute unpublished opinion
issued in the direct appeal, State v. Barnes, Docket No. 37995 (Ct.App.
5/4/2012):

Following a report of concerns that Barnes and her boyfriend, Gregory
1
Klundt, were manufacturing methamphetamine in their shared
residence, law enforcement obtained a warrant to search their house.
The search revealed a number of items associated with the
manufacture of methamphetamine. The state charged Barnes with
conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine by manufacture, I.C. §§ 372732B(a)(3) and 18-204; trafficking in methamphetamine by
manufacture, I.C. §§ 37-2732B(a)(3) and 18-204; and possession of a
controlled substance, pseudoephedrine, with intent to manufacture
methamphetamine, I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A). After trial, a jury found
Barnes guilty. Barnes was sentenced to concurrent determinate terms
2
of five years for each count. Barnes appeals.
[Footnotes]
1 Klundt was also charged with the same crimes. The district court
joined Barnes's and Klundt's cases for trial. However, the cases
were not consolidated on appeal.

2 Barnes was also found guilty of manufacture of a controlled
substance where a child is present, I.C. § 37-2737A, and was
sentenced to a consecutive indeterminate two-year term. However,
she does not challenge this judgment of conviction or sentence on
appeal.
Id. p. 2.

1

While the Court of Appeals initially vacated the conviction on Count Three
due to a double jeopardy violation, upon rehearing it affirmed all of the
convictions and sentences. (R. p. 100.)
Ms. Barnes also filed the instant pro se petition for post conviction relief.
(R. p. 5-9.)

Counsel was appointed. (R. p. 11.)

Counsel ultimately filed an

amended petition for post conviction relief and affidavit of Petitioner in support.
(R. p. 19-23, 24-27.)

The state filed an answer and a motion for summary

disposition as to some, but not all of the claims and conceded some needed to
be resolved at an evidentiary hearing. (R. p. 28-29; 39-40.) Following a hearing
in which the Petitioner withdrew some claims, the court entered its order
dismissing them but setting the rest for evidentiary hearing. (R. p. 42.)
At the end of the evidentiary hearing the court set a briefing schedule and
Petitioner and the Respondent both submitted post-trial briefs. (R. p. 45-90; 9198.)
The court issued its written order denying post conviction relief. (R. p. 99112.) A written judgment was entered. (R. p. 113.)
Appellant timely appeals. (R. p. 115.)

2

ISSUE

Whether the district court erred when it denied post conviction relief after an
evidentiary hearing, rejecting Petitioner's assertion that she had received
ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest arising from her
attorney's concurrent representation of a co-defendant.

3

ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUMMARILY DENIED THE POSTCONVICTION RELIEF PETITION BECAUSE PETITIONER'S ATTORNEY WAS
BURDENED BY A CONFLICT OF INTEREST DUE TO HIS CONCURRENT
REPRESENTATION OF A CO-DEFENDANT

A.

Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal
The relevant standards were comprehensively explained in Medina v.

State, 132 Idaho 722, 979 P.2d 124 (Ct.App. 1999):
In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the applicant
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the allegations
upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. Follinus
v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 908 P.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1995); see also
I.C. § 19-4907 (stating that all rules and statutes applicable in civil
proceedings are available to the parties in a postconviction relief
case). Once the district court has denied or granted the post
conviction application following a hearing, the evidence must be
viewed most favorably to the trial court's findings. Reynolds v.
State, 126 Idaho 24, 28,878 P.2d 198,202 (Ct. App. 1994).
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their
testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all
matters solely within the province of the district court. Larkin v.
State, 115 Idaho 72, 764 P.2d 439 (Ct. App. 1988). On appeal,
findings of fact made by the trial court shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52 (a); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65,
794 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1990). Findings supported by competent
and substantial evidence produced at the hearing will not be
disturbed. Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 711, 905 P.2d 642,
644 (Ct. App. 1995). However, this Court freely reviews the legal
conclusions drawn by the trial court from the facts found. Id.
Id. at p. 724-725.
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B.

Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel
The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is

well established, being set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984).

The "benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be

whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result." Id. at 686.
Strickland set forth a two-prong test which a defendant must satisfy in

order to be entitled to relief.

The defendant must demonstrate both that his

counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of
the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 687-88; State v. Charboneau,
116 Idaho 129 (1989); Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986).

C.

The Evidentiary Hearing and the Court's Rulings
The background of the claims is explained in the court's Opinion and

Order Re: Post Conviction Relief (hereinafter Opinion):
In the underlying criminal case Barnes was initially represented by
John Redal. Redal also represented the co-defendant, Gregory
Klundt. The joint representation continued through the motion to
suppress which was made on behalf of both defendants and which
was denied. Following the decision on the motion to suppress
Redal withdrew as Barnes' attorney and Michael Palmer was
appointed to represent her. Palmer substituted in as counsel for
Barnes on May 7, 2010. The joint trial of both defendants began on
May 25, 2010. One of the issues at trial concerned the results of
the prosecution's re-testing of evidence by the state drug laboratory
5

with the results provided to Barnes' attorney just days prior to the
trial.
Opinion p. 2. (R. p. 100.)
Petitioner alleged various claims arising from the above situation. The
most important claim, and the only one pursued in this appeal, is ineffective
assistance of counsel due to the conflict of interest arising from counsel
representing both co-defendants through the majority of the case. This led to
additional problems, because

counsel's late advice of his conflict of interest

caused Petitioner to obtain appointed counsel just weeks before the jury trial.
This in turn led to appointed counsel being unprepared for the trial (which he
conceded at the evidentiary hearing) and his specific failings included his failure
to have the inconsistent lab results retested, his failure to

interview and call

requested witnesses, and his failure to move to sever the co-defendants' trials.
But again,

Appellant is only pursuing the main conflict of interest claim in this

appeal.
Petitioner's post trial brief did a good job of explaining the relevant
evidence was produced at the evidentiary hearing .
. . . Ms. Barnes testified that she and her codefendant, Greg Klundt,
were charged with the same crimes encompassing the same basic
underlying criminal conduct; drug trafficking in methamphetamine
or amphetamine
by manufacture,
controlled
substance
manufacture, deliver or posses when children are present,
possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture
methamphetamine, and drug trafficking in methamphetamine. The
manufacturing and trafficking offenses carried with them a
mandatory minimum period of imprisonment of five years. Ms.
Barnes testified that John Redal represented her and her codefendant until May 4, 2010, when Mr. Redal withdrew as attorney
of record. Ms. Barnes indicated that Mr. Redal met with her and her
co-defendant but never discussed the possibility of testifying
6

against her co-defendant, or presenting evidence of limited
culpability based on a defense implicating her co-defendant as the
principal. Mr. Redal failed to alert the Court to a potential conflict of
interest in Ms. Barnes' case and the Court did not inquire about the
conflict of interest between the two jointly represented codefendants.
Rather, as testified to by Mr. Redal, he withdrew as counsel mere
weeks before trial when he determined that the case was bound for
trial and representation of both co-defendants would be
problematic. Mr. Michael Palmer testified that he was appointed on
May 7, 2010, and likely did not obtain information relating to the
case until days later. Trial was set for May 25, 2010. Ms. Barnes
testified that she only met with Mr. Palmer once before the pre-trial
conference on May 21, 2010, and at that fifteen minute meeting Mr.
Palmer had not had an opportunity to review the discovery in the
case and was unable to discuss with Ms. Barnes the state's
evidence. Ms. Barnes testified that she met with Mr. Palmer the day
before the pretrial conference on May 21, 2010 and then just
moments before the her [sic] trial began on May 25, 2010. Ms.
Barnes indicated that at she had requested Mr. Palmer to seek a
continuance at the pretrial conference but was told the prosecutor
was ready so the case was going to proceed. Ms. Barnes gave Mr.
Palmer and Mr. Redal the names of potential witnesses but there is
no indication that Mr. Palmer or Mr. Redal made any effort to
investigate or interview her witnesses. Ms. Barnes testified that Mr.
Palmer never went over the state's evidence with her, specifically,
the photos taken of the inside of her home and used as evidence at
trial, nor did he discuss her trial rights. Mr. Palmer testified that the
state disclosed, the day before trial, lab results which were positive
for the presence of methamphetamine where previously the results
had been negative. Mr. Palmer did not seek independent testing of
the substances given the conflicting laboratory results, nor did he
seek a continuance of the trial due to the late disclosure of the
laboratory results.
Mr. Palmer did not meet with any of Ms. Barnes' witnesses, did not
use the assistance of an investigator, did not attempt to have
independent testing of substances, and inadequately educated
himself on the manufacturing methamphetamine process in order to
intelligently and effectively cross examine the state's expert
witnesses. Furthermore, Mr. Palmer did not move to have the case
severed for trial. Mr. Palmer testified that proceeding to trial with
Ms. Barnes' codefendant was error, and prejudiced Ms. Barnes'
ability to present a defense.
Brief in Support of Petition for Post Conviction Relief, p. 5-7. (R. p. 49-51.)
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Additionally,

the

court's

Opinion

described

the

relevant

evidence

presented as follows:
At the post-conviction trial Redal testified that he was retained by
Klundt and Barnes in 2009. He did not recall whether he initially
discussed potential conflicts of interest with them. It was his usual
practice to do so, but he could not specifically recall doing so in this
case. When it became apparent that the cases were going to trial
he discussed the conflict of interest with Barnes, and she elected to
have the Kootenai County Public Defender's office represent her.
Palmer was then appointed.
Attorney Anne Taylor testified she believes it is a conflict of interest
to represent two individuals charged with the same crimes, that she
would have moved to sever the trial of the co-defendants and if, as
was the case here, the state had evidence of inconsistent
laboratory drug tests she would have advised the client and
requested a continuance of the trial.
Palmer testified that based on his late entry into the case he did not
have time to prepare for trial and that when he became aware the
state had inconsistent laboratory drug tests he should have
requested a continuance and sought an independent drug test. He
testified he did not know why he did not do so in this case. He
testified it was his usual practice to request a severance of trials for
co-defendants, and he could not recall why he did not do so here.
Barnes testified she met with Redal only three times, and the
substance of the case against her was not discussed. Redal never
discussed the possibility of her testifying against Klundt. Redal
never told her there was a conflict of interest until after the decision
on the motion to suppress, and she then applied for the public
defender to represent her. She met with Palmer on May 10 or May
11 and again prior to trial. She testified that trial strategy and
witnesses were not discussed ....
Opinion p. 3-4. (R. p. 101-102.)
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court found as follows:
Barnes contends she is entitled to a presumption of prejudice. This
is not a case where there has been a complete denial of counsel at
a critical stage of trial. The record shows that Redal, at the
suppression hearing, and Palmer, at trial, subjected the
prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing. Competent
8

counsel could, and did, provide effective assistance. The claim
based on presumptive prejudice is denied.
Redal represented Barnes through the suppression hearing. No
claim has been made that Redal failed to effectively represent her
at that hearing. The claim against Redal is that his joint
representation of Klundt and Barnes created a conflict of interest
prejudicing Barnes. No facts were presented by Barnes to show
that in connection with the suppression hearing her interests were
different from those of Klundt or that Redal failed to present facts or
arguments on her behalf at the suppression hearing. Daugherty v.
State, 102 Idaho 782,640 P.2d 1183 (1982) held:
A lawyer or law firm should carefully consider the potential
for conflict of interest before representing multiple
defendants in a criminal case. However, representation of
multiple criminal defendants does not constitute a ''per se"
violation of the constitutional guaranty of effective assistance
of counsel. As the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Roles [v.
State, 100 Idaho 717,719,604 P.2d 731 (1979)]:
Absent a showing there was at least a possible
conflict of interest between the co-defendants at the
time the joint representation existed which may
have inhibited the attorney's ability to act for the best
interests of each codefendant at all times during that
representation, there is no basis for the defendant's
claim that his sixth amendment right to effective
counsel was abridged.
Id. 102 Idaho at 783-84, 640 P .2d at 1184-85 (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).

In Roles v. State, 100 Idaho 717, 604 P.2d 731 (1979) an attorney
represented co-defendants. Roles alleged on post-conviction relief
that this constituted a conflict of interest denying him the effective
assistance of counsel. The Court rejected this contention, holding:
However, while an actual conflict of interest might have
occurred if Roles had proceeded to trial with his original
court appointed counsel, his guilty plea prevented that
conflict from ever materializing. Joint representation of codefendants does not of itself constitute denial of a criminal
defendant's right to effective counsel.
Id. at 719, 604 P.2d at 733.
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Barnes has not shown that "at the time of the joint representation" a
conflict of interest existed which inhibited Redal's ability to act in her
best interests.
Opinion p. 7-9 (R. p. 107-109.)

C.

The Court Erred in Denying Post Conviction Relief
Appellant asserts that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed

the petition for post conviction relief which was based on the attorney's conflict of
interest arising from concurrently representing co-defendants.

The relevant law

as explained by various Idaho cases is described below. First is the explanation
by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53 (2003):
The right to conflict-free representation derives from the Sixth
Amendment as applied to the states by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68,
77 L. Ed. 158, 53 S. Ct. 55 (1932). This right has been accorded
"not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability
of the accused to receive a fair trial." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S.
162,_, 152 L. Ed. 2d 291, 122 S. Ct. 1237 (2002), citing United
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 104 S. Ct. 2039
(1984). It follows from this that assistance which is ineffective in
preserving fairness does not meet the constitutional mandate. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S.
Ct. 2052 (1984).
Whenever a trial court knows or reasonably should know that a
particular conflict may exist, the trial court has a duty of inquiry. See
Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272-73, 67 L.Ed.2d 220, 101 S. Ct.
1097 (1981); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347, 64 L. Ed. 2d
333, 100 S. Ct. 1708 (1980). The scope and nature of the
affirmative duty of the trial judge to assure that criminal defendants
are not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by joint
representation of conflicting interests is second only to the concern
as to how strong a showing of conflict must be made before a
court will conclude that the defendants have been deprived of their
right to effective assistance. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S.
475, 483, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426, 98 S. Ct. 1173 (1978). "In order to
establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who
10

raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict
of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Cuyler,
446 U.S. at 348. However, "until a defendant shows that his
counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not
established the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective
assistance." Id. at 350.
Id. p. 60, 61.

The relevant law was also discussed by the Idaho Court of Appeals in
State v. Koch, 116 Idaho 571 (Ct. App. 1989):

The multiple defendant issue requires more elaborate discussion.
Matsuura represented both Koch and a co-defendant. Under the
Sixth Amendment, an accused has the right to representation free
from conflicts of interest. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 101
S.Ct. 1097, 1103, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981 ). Joint representation is
not a per se violation of this right. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S.
475, 482, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1177, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Roles v.
State, 100 Idaho 717,719,604 P.2d 731, 733 (1979). However, the
courts have recognized that "a possible conflict [of interest] inheres
in almost every instance of multiple representation." Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333
(1980) (emphasis added).
Consequently, a conflict of interest arising from an attorney's
representation of multiple defendants has been expressly excepted
from the requirement that actual prejudice be shown. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. This exception
reflects the Supreme Court's holding in Cuyler, that prejudice is
presumed when defense counsel is burdened by an actual conflict
of interest. However the narrowness of this exception must be
emphasized. A presumption of prejudice is triggered only by an
actual conflict of interest. The conflict itself must be shown; it will
not be presumed. As stated in Cuyler, prejudice is presumed only if
the defendant demonstrates that counsel "actively represented
conflicting interests" and "that an actual conflict of interest
adversely affected his lawyer's performance." 446 U.S. at 346, 348,
100 S.Ct. at 1717, 1718. Thus, there is not a double presumption of
conflict and prejudice in a multiple representation case. McNeeley
v. State, 111 ldaho200, 722 P.2d 1067 (Ct.App.1986).
Id. p. 574.
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The district court's ruling on the conflict issue will be repeated for this
Court's convenience:
Redal represented Barnes through the suppression hearing. No
claim has been made that Redal failed to effectively represent her
at that hearing. The claim against Redal is that his joint
representation of Klundt and Barnes created a conflict of interest
prejudicing Barnes. No facts were presented by Barnes to show
that in connection with the suppression hearing her interests were
different from those of Klundt or that Redal failed to present facts or
arguments on her behalf at the suppression hearing. Daugherty v.
State, 102 Idaho 782, 640 P.2d 1183 (1982) held:
A lawyer or law firm should carefully consider the potential
for conflict of interest before representing multiple
defendants in a criminal case. However, representation of
multiple criminal defendants does not constitute a ''per se"
violation of the constitutional guaranty of effective assistance
of counsel. As the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Roles [v.
State, 100 Idaho 717,719,604 P.2d 731 (1979)]:
Absent a showing there was at least a possible
conflict of interest between the co-defendants at the
time the joint representation existed which may
have inhibited the attorney's ability to act for the best
interests of each codefendant at all times during that
representation, there is no basis for the defendant's
claim that his sixth amendment right to effective
counsel was abridged.
Id. 102 Idaho at 783-84, 640 P .2d at 1184-85 (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).

In Roles v. State, 100 Idaho 717,604 P.2d 731 (1979) an attorney
represented co-defendants. Roles alleged on post-conviction relief
that this constituted a conflict of interest denying him the effective
assistance of counsel. The Court rejected this contention, holding:
However, while an actual conflict of interest might have
occurred if Roles had proceeded to trial with his original
court appointed counsel, his guilty plea prevented that
conflict from ever materializing. Joint representation of codefendants does not of itself constitute denial of a criminal
defendant's right to effective counsel.
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Id. at 719, 604 P.2d at 733.

Barnes has not shown that "at the time of the joint representation" a
conflict of interest existed which inhibited Redal's ability to act in her
best interests.
Opinion, p. 7-9. (R. p. 107-109.)
The court seems to misunderstand the claim. The point is not that the codefendants had different interests at the suppression hearing or that Redal failed
to do something at the suppression hearing due to the conflict. Rather, the point
is that throughout the joint representation the co-defendants had different
interests and the attorney's ability to act in the best interest of Ms. Barnes was
inhibited by the attorney's duties to Mr. Klundt.
The basic

reason for this is there was a different level of culpability

between the co-defendants (and a different expected punishment).

In other

words, as is so common in drug cases, the boyfriend is the prime mover in the
offense, and the girlfriend is the follower.

This was the case here, as was

established in both the criminal case and the evidentiary hearing on the post
conviction.
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Palmer testified, albeit in the context of the
failure to bring a motion to sever, about the relative culpability of the codefendants:
... I believe that the culpability here in this particular case and the
evidence that I had rested with the codefendant. My client
happened to sort of just be there riding along. And they lived
together. They shared the same room together. There was certainly
evidence that they were doing the same drugs together. But he was
probably the principal in the manufacturing of it. ...
Tr. p. 90, In. 24--p. 91, In. 6.
13

Also relevant was Petitioner's

minor criminal history.

The prosecutor

established at the evidentiary hearing that Ms. Barnes had only a minor criminal
history with several misdemeanors, to wit, a DUI in 1994 and a driving without
privileges in 2005. (Tr. p. 117.)
Further relevant was the fact that two of the charged offenses carried a
five year mandatory minimum sentence (and another charge required a two year
consecutive sentence). (R. p. 49.)
At the sentencing in the criminal case, the court made basically the same
findings. 1 At sentencing, the prosecutor requested the shortest amount of fixed
time possible, 5 years, followed by 5 years indeterminate.
362.)

(Tr., 7/29/2101, p.

The court actually imposed an even shorter sentence.

The court

sentenced Ms. Barnes to 5 years fixed with no indeterminate time on three
counts to run concurrent (two of which required a mandatory minimum sentence
of five years), followed by two years indeterminate

for a count which was

required to run consecutive. (Tr., 7/29/2101, p. 367.) In short, the court imposed
the

shortest sentence that it possibly could given the five year mandatory

minimum sentence and the two year mandatory consecutive sentence.
The court explained at sentencing:
That's somewhat less of a sentence than I imposed upon Mr.
Klundt. He had certainly a longer prior record and, I suspect, was
perhaps more intimately involved in the crime than you were. The
difference in the sentence is not significant, but yours is less than
what I sentenced him to.

1

The transcript of the underlying criminal case was admitted at the evidentiary
hearing. (R. p. 102.) Appellant has contemporaneously herewith requested this
Court take judicial notice of it.
14

Tr., 7/29/2101, p. 367, Ins. 17-22.
Some of the court's further reasoning for the sentence imposed included
that it was Ms. Barnes first serious crime and her prior record was just the
misdemeanors. (Tr., 7/29/2101, p. 366.)

More significant was the court's

statement that the facts of the case showed the court that while being guilty of
the charges, Ms. Barnes was not manufacturing metharnphetamine for sale or
distribution, it was simply for personal use. (Tr., 7/29/2101, p. 366.)
Finally as to the sentencing, as Mr. Palmer argued, had Ms. Barnes just
gone out and bought the methamphetamine, they would probably be talking
about a withheld judgment and probation given the quantities and her prior
record. (Tr., 7/29/2101, p. 362.)
Given all this, what was in the best interest for Petitioner was for her to
enter into an early plea bargain in the case which would avoid the 5 year
mandatory minimum sentence and/or

the

two year mandatory consecutive

sentence. Again, the state requested only the mandatory minimum fixed time
even after a jury trial and the court imposed the shortest possible sentence.
Given this, as well as the relative culpability of the co-defendants, Petitioner's
criminal history,

and because the manufacturing was for personal use rather

than for sale, it cannot be seriously believed that the parties could not have
resolved this case via an early plea bargain that would have resulted in a shorter
prison sentence.
But Petitioner's attorney could not advise her to enter into such a plea
bargain because it would have been directly adverse to the co-defendant he also

15

represented. 2 Had she pied guilty, Ms. Barnes could have been called to testify
again Mr. Klundt in the jury trial since she would no longer have a 5th amendment
right against self incrimination. Even if the state did not desire to proceed with
live testimony given the boyfriend/girlfriend situation, Mr. Barnes' change of plea
hearing transcript where she would admit to whatever offense could be admitted
in Mr. Klundt's trial. This would sink him just as handily without the necessity of
Petitioner's live testimony.
In short, in order to adequately represent Mr. Klundt, Redel could not
advise

Ms. Barnes to plead guilty as she should. Thus,

represented conflicting interests

Redel actively

and an actual conflict of interest adversely

affected his performance and so prejudice is presumed.
While Redel ultimately recognized his conflict of interest and Ms. Barnes
obtained her own lawyer mere weeks before the trial date, this did not cure the
adverse affect of the conflict because by that time the opportunity for an

early

plea bargain was gone.
To summarize, given the differing culpability and criminal records of the
two co-defendants, there was an inherent conflict of interest in concurrent
representation.

Given her position in all of this and the presence of charges

requiring mandatory minimum sentences, Petitioner should have been advised
to enter into a plea bargain which would have resulted in less prison time, but
she was represented by the same attorney who also represented the more
culpable defendant who would be harmed by this course of action. Thus, there

2

At the evidentiary hearing, neither Redal
bargains were ever discussed.
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nor Petitioner testified that plea

was an actual conflict which adversely affected Petitioner and so prejudice is
presumed and her convictions must be vacated.

CONCLUSION
Wherefore,

for the

reasons as stated

above, Appellant/Petitioner

respectfully requests that the district court's denial of post conviction relief be
reversed and that Ms. Barnes' convictions be vacated.
DATED this

i

rh
day of February, 2013.
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